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Howell’s book develops and defends a stance on the Problem of Consciousness that he labels 
‘subjective physicalism’. The Problem of Consciousness revolves around the apparent inexplicability 
of conscious experience in physical terms. As Howell explains (p. 1), philosophers reflecting on this 
problem have divided into three main factions: i) ‘hardliners’ who claim that consciousness can be 
fully accounted for by the physical sciences; ii) ‘epistemicists’ who deny that the physical sciences 
can yield a full understanding of consciousness but who maintain that consciousness is ultimately 
physical; iii) ‘non-physicalists’ who hold that the inevitable failure of physical science to provide a full 
understanding of consciousness entails that Physicalism is false. Epistemicism is the most popular 
option, and Howell’s own position falls firmly in this camp: ‘…subjective physicalism is the view that 
ontologically the world is entirely physical. Everything that there is supervenes upon the basic 
physical particles and properties. Nevertheless, not every feature of the world can be completely 
grasped by objective theorizing.’ (p. 6) The key message of the book, however, is that most of 
Howell’s epistemicist allies have dismissed the Problem of Consciousness too lightly. In particular, 
Howell argues that epistemicists must commit to ‘...a special epistemic relation [of] acquaintance…’ 
and ‘…deny that any objective depiction of the world can be complete’. (p.2) Neither concession sits 
comfortably with the Physicalist outlook so Howell’s arguments, if defensible, would have significant 
implications for the debate. 
The book divides into three parts. Part I - ‘Defining Physicalism’ - consists of two chapters 
exploring the vexed issue of what exactly it means for Physicalism to be true. Chapter 1 asks ‘What 
does it mean for a property to be physical?’ (p. 13) Howell efficiently works through a number of 
familiar proposals, including appeals to ideal physics and ‘via negativa’ characterisations of the 
physical, but shows that none are satisfactory. He introduces a clear and effective definition of 
physicality according to which ‘[a] property is physical iff it can be fully characterised in terms of the 
conditions it places on the distribution of things in space over time.’ (p. 24) In recognition of its 
Cartesian flavour, the definition is labelled ‘Neocart’. Physicalists need not claim that all properties 
satisfy Neocart. Rather, they should hold that a certain set of base properties satisfy Neocart and 
that all non-basic properties are physical in virtue of being appropriately related to those base 
properties. The challenge taken up in Chapter 2 is to characterise this all-important relation. Rather 
than introducing a novel account, Howell takes the classic line that the relevant relation is 
supervenience. This view has fallen out of favour due to worries that ‘…it is compatible with 
numerous non-physicalist doctrines.’ (p. 46) But Howell offers interesting and compelling reasons to 
think that the supervenience model actually excludes such non-physicalist positions. (pp. 49-53) 
Part II of the book – ‘The Threat of the Subjective’ – revolves around Jackson’s (1982) 
famous Knowledge Argument against Physicalism. Epistemicists respond to this argument by 
conceding that Mary the super-scientist learns something new when she perceives red for the first 
time. But Mary does not, they claim, learn about non-physical properties. Rather, Mary learns 
something new about familiar physical properties - something that wasn’t available to her from 
within her prison. The key conclusion of Chapter 3 is that ‘…all of the epistemicist responses to the 
argument…ultimately collapse to subtle variations of the “acquaintance theory.” (p. 56) An 
acquaintance theory is one ‘…which holds that there is a way of knowing one’s own experiences that 
provides a grasp of those experiences that no other way of knowing can provide.’ (p. 73) Thus Mary is 
only able to achieve a full grasp of the nature of reddish experiences by being acquainted with her 
own tokening of such experience. Chapter 4 shows how acquaintance is at odds with objectivism. 
Objectivism says that an agent can achieve a complete understanding of the world without needing 
to adopt any specific point of view. If the acquaintance theorist is right that one cannot, for instance, 
fully understand the nature of reddish experiences without having a reddish experience oneself, 
then objectivism is false. 
Objectivism is an epistemic thesis about the understandability of theories. What does the 
failure of objectivism mean for the metaphysical thesis made by Physicalists? In Part III – ‘Saving 
Physicalism’ – Howell argues that the falsity of objectivism is consistent with the truth of 
Physicalism. These three chapters develop Howell’s ‘subjective physicalism’. Chapter 5 defends 
subjective physicalism against the worry that ‘…if physicalism is true there is little substantive sense 
to be given to Mary’s learning anything upon exiting her room.’ (p. 102) The Presentation Argument 
against Physicalism suggests that if things appear in some new way to Mary when she escapes, there 
must be some previously unknown property in virtue of which they so appear. Here Howell 
challenges the assumptions this argument makes about the relationship between properties and 
epistemic space. A parallel move then allows him to rebut the ubiquitous Conceivability Argument. 
Chapter 6 asks what exactly it is that Mary learns and considers how it is possible for the 
phenomenal facts to be necessitated by the basic physical facts without being deducible from a 
knowledge of those facts. A thoughtful and challenging account of the epistemic status of 
consciousness is offered which holds that ‘…our thoughts about phenomenal states involve them 
directly in a way that our thoughts about other things do not.’ (p. 132) Chapter 7 weighs up the costs 
and benefits of subjective physicalism, comparing it with the competing positions. Accepting 
subjective physicalism means accepting that consciousness can never be fully explained, tolerating 
the somewhat mysterious relation of acquaintance and conceding that physics and the objective 
sciences cannot ‘…give us a complete understanding of the world.’ (p. 172) Nevertheless, the crucial 
advantages it has over hardliner and non-physicalist positions mean that subjective physicalism 
ultimately wins out. 
This book is concerned exclusively with how best to address the metaphysical problem of 
consciousness. Those looking for comments on the latest empirical data, reflections on our 
phenomenology or positive theorising about the origins of consciousness should look elsewhere. But 
for those interested in whether consciousness is compatible with Physicalism it has a great deal to 
offer. Howell’s arguments are precise and their presentation is, for the most part, very clear. The 
greatest strength of the book is Howell’s meticulous attention to the interaction between epistemic 
and metaphysical considerations. The result is a credible account of where the anti-physicalist 
arguments go wrong and of the substantial costs entailed by an epistemicist response to those 
arguments. 
Considering the complexity of the issues addressed, Howell is admirably succinct, cutting 
straight to the heart of each issue discussed. It might be felt that some sections would benefit from a 
more expansive treatment though. Given that the central theme of the book is the incompatibility of 
acquaintance and objectivism, it is surprising that we are not given detailed pictures of either. 
Howell does demonstrate that acquaintance and objectivism are incompatible, but until we are 
offered a comprehensive theory of the acquaintance relation and a thorough evaluation of the 
motivations behind objectivism, conclusively choosing between them will be difficult. 
This is not a book of radical new proposals. Rather, Howell’s project is to make the best of 
some familiar insights. We are given a decidedly ‘old school’ picture of physicality and Physicalism, a 
fairly standard reading of the anti-physicalist arguments and an extended defence of the majority 
view that the epistemic gap on which those arguments rely does not entail a metaphysical gap. 
What, then, does Howell’s book contribute? One of the difficult things about epistemicism is that it 
comes in so many different forms (p. 72). In Chapter 3 Howell shows that disparate views such as the 
phenomenal concept strategy, the indexical response and the ability hypothesis all boil down to the 
same single idea that what Mary lacks in her monochromatic prison is knowledge-by-acquaintance. 
Similarly, in Chapter 6 Howell suggests that ineffability proposals and quotational models each go 
some way toward capturing how acquaintance underwrites phenomenal knowledge. The ‘subjective 
physicalist’ position Howell develops can thus be seen as a kind of distillation of decades of 
epistemicist theorising. This serves to show exactly what epistemicism has to offer and, more 
importantly, reveals the costs it entails. Indeed, Howell’s honest reflections on the disadvantages of 
subjective physicalism are among the most interesting ideas in the book.  
Howell’s cost/benefit analysis identifies the key choice-points we face when confronting the 
Problem of Consciousness and concludes that subjective physicalism is preferable to its competitors. 
There may be reasons to think that Howell overestimates the cost of non-physicalism and 
underestimates the cost of subjective physicalism. 
Regarding the costs of non-physicalism, Howell argues that non-physicalists are 
unacceptably committed to the causal inefficacy of phenomenal properties. This claim is integral to 
Howell’s argument in Chapter 5 (p. 111) that Mary’s knowledge does not involve metaphysically 
novel properties. It is also integral to his argument in Chapter 7 (p. 164) that subjective physicalism is 
preferable to property dualism, which is of particular importance given his observation that the two 
positions come surprisingly close to each other (p. 162). One problem here is that Howell takes it for 
granted that the familiar ‘exclusion argument’ against the efficacy of non-physical properties is 
sound. It could easily be objected that this argument is far from conclusive, resting as it does on 
disputable claims about the metaphysics of causation. A second problem is Howell’s failure to 
address ‘Russellian’ forms of non-physicalism.1 These views claim that the structural properties 
described by the physical sciences are grounded in hidden intrinsic properties, and that these 
properties are either themselves phenomenal or are integral to the explanation of phenomenal 
properties. This oversight significantly limits Howell’s arguments because a) Russellian theories are 
specifically designed to avoid the exclusion argument on which Howell so heavily relies, b) the 
Russellian claim that physical entities have a hidden intrinsic nature looks particularly credible if we 
accept, as Howell does in Chapter 1, that the physical sciences describe only the structural 
properties of physical entities, and c) Russellianism has increasingly become the dominant stance 
among non-physicalists, meaning that Howell is working with an unrepresentative picture of the 
non-physicalist camp. 
Regarding the costs of subjective physicalism, Howell concedes that physical theory cannot 
explain what it is like to experience redness but emphasises that this is consistent with Physicalism. 
One worry that Howell does not consider is that when Mary learns about reddish phenomenal 
qualities, she learns something about their nature that precludes the possibility of those qualities 
being physical. A tempting suggestion here is that qualitative redness is revealed as a categorical 
intrinsic property. Since physical properties are dispositional properties – as Howell effectively 
concludes in Chapter 1 – Mary can infer that qualitative redness is not one of the properties 
described by physical theory. Of course, Howell could resist this line of argument, but I imagine that 
in doing so he would come dangerously close to the ‘hardliner’ view of consciousness that he seeks 
to avoid. The kind of worry I’m pushing here is naturally captured through qualia inversion 
arguments. Curiously, these important arguments are not mentioned in the book. 
 Howell also concedes that the acquaintance relation is left unexplained (p. 147) but 
maintains that this is consistent with Physicalism. Again, it is not entirely clear that this is so. 
Acquaintance is an epistemic relation afforded by all and only phenomenal states. A strong case 
could be made for thinking that the mystery of consciousness is simply the mystery of how 
phenomenal acquaintance can arise from insentient matter. By presupposing that this relation is 
ultimately physical, Howell could be accused of skimming over the real problem. Interestingly, 
Howell does suggest that acquaintance itself is something we know through acquaintance, allowing 
him to re-apply his thesis that learning by acquaintance need not involve the introduction of any 
metaphysically new properties (p. 148). In parallel to my previous objection though, one might 
respond that acquaintance just isn’t the kind of thing that can transpire to be physical. As with so 
many disputes in the metaphysics of consciousness, it is not clear where the burden of proof lies 
here, or which side is begging the question against their opponent. 
 Overall Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity is a thoughtful and stimulating book that 
insightfully identifies the fundamental issues that divide the metaphysics of consciousness and which 
reaches some credible and important conclusions about the commitments and consequences of 
epistemicist responses to the Problem of Consciousness. 
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